Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. he...

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Main Authors: Saxe, Rebecca R., Scholz, Jonathan, Young, Liane
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Informa UK (Taylor & Francis) 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70035
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
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author Saxe, Rebecca R.
Scholz, Jonathan
Young, Liane
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Scholz, Jonathan
Young, Liane
author_sort Saxe, Rebecca R.
collection MIT
description Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent's intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.
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spelling mit-1721.1/700352022-09-26T12:22:11Z Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts Saxe, Rebecca R. Scholz, Jonathan Young, Liane Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Saxe, Rebecca R. Saxe, Rebecca R. Scholz, Jonathan Young, Liane Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent's intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information. Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging Simons Foundation National Science Foundation (U.S.) John Merck Scholars Program 2012-04-13T19:34:49Z 2012-04-13T19:34:49Z 2011-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1747-0919 1747-0927 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70035 Young, Liane, Jonathan Scholz, and Rebecca Saxe. “Neural Evidence for ‘intuitive Prosecution’: The Use of Mental State Information for Negative Moral Verdicts.” Social Neuroscience 6.3 (2011): 302–315. Web. 13 Apr. 2012. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2010.529712 Social Neuroscience Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Informa UK (Taylor & Francis) Prof. Saxe
spellingShingle Saxe, Rebecca R.
Scholz, Jonathan
Young, Liane
Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title_full Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title_fullStr Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title_full_unstemmed Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title_short Neural evidence for "intuitive prosecution": The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
title_sort neural evidence for intuitive prosecution the use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70035
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2377-1791
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