Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain
1 Pain perception Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is devoted to outlining a perceptual...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70542 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 |
| Summary: | 1 Pain perception
Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable
difficulties for representational theories of consciousness. Chris Hill is never one to
dodge a problem, and chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is
devoted to outlining a perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of
Armstrong and Pitcher. |
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