Robust comparative statics in large static games

We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative games. In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, the average of the actions among the players). In lar...

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Main Authors: Acemoglu, Daron, Jensen, Martin Kaae
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70922
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
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author Acemoglu, Daron
Jensen, Martin Kaae
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Acemoglu, Daron
Jensen, Martin Kaae
author_sort Acemoglu, Daron
collection MIT
description We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative games. In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, the average of the actions among the players). In large games, players take these aggregates as given. We derive comparative static results for large aggregative games, showing both how equilibrium aggregates and the behavior of each player change in response to various different types of changes in parameters. Our results can also be interpreted as comparative statics of ∈-equilibria in games in which there is a large but finite number of players, who still take their impact on aggregates into account in choosing their strategies. We illustrate how these results can be applied easily using two examples: (1) large single or multi-dimensional contests; (2) large beauty contests where each player's strategy is a probability distribution.
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spelling mit-1721.1/709222022-09-30T14:59:34Z Robust comparative statics in large static games Acemoglu, Daron Jensen, Martin Kaae Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Acemoglu, Daron We provide general comparative static results for large finite and infinite-dimensional aggregative games. In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, the average of the actions among the players). In large games, players take these aggregates as given. We derive comparative static results for large aggregative games, showing both how equilibrium aggregates and the behavior of each player change in response to various different types of changes in parameters. Our results can also be interpreted as comparative statics of ∈-equilibria in games in which there is a large but finite number of players, who still take their impact on aggregates into account in choosing their strategies. We illustrate how these results can be applied easily using two examples: (1) large single or multi-dimensional contests; (2) large beauty contests where each player's strategy is a probability distribution. 2012-05-24T15:22:32Z 2012-05-24T15:22:32Z 2010-12 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 978-1-4244-7746-3 978-1-4244-7745-6 0743-1546 0191-2216 INSPEC Accession Number: 11848445 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70922 Acemoglu, Daron, and Martin Kaae Jensen. “Robust Comparative Statics in Large Static Games.” IEEE, 2010. 3133–3139. Web. © 2010 IEEE. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2010.5717147 Proceedings of the 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2010 Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE
spellingShingle Acemoglu, Daron
Jensen, Martin Kaae
Robust comparative statics in large static games
title Robust comparative statics in large static games
title_full Robust comparative statics in large static games
title_fullStr Robust comparative statics in large static games
title_full_unstemmed Robust comparative statics in large static games
title_short Robust comparative statics in large static games
title_sort robust comparative statics in large static games
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70922
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491
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