Political model of social evolution
Almost all democratic societies evolved socially and politically out of authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes. These changes not only altered the allocation of economic resources in society but also the structure of political power. In this paper, we develop a framework for studying the dynamics o...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/71844 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
| _version_ | 1811069503698632704 |
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| author | Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, Daron |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Almost all democratic societies evolved socially and politically out of authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes. These changes not only altered the allocation of economic resources in society but also the structure of political power. In this paper, we develop a framework for studying the dynamics of political and social change. The society consists of agents that care about current and future social arrangements and economic allocations; allocation of political power determines who has the capacity to implement changes in economic allocations and future allocations of power. The set of available social rules and allocations at any point in time is stochastic. We show that political and social change may happen without any stochastic shocks or as a result of a shock destabilizing an otherwise stable social arrangement. Crucially, the process of social change is contingent (and history-dependent): the timing and sequence of stochastic events determine the long-run equilibrium social arrangements. For example, the extent of democratization may depend on how early uncertainty about the set of feasible reforms in the future is resolved. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:11:29Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/71844 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:11:29Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/718442022-09-23T11:29:34Z Political model of social evolution Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, K. Daron Acemoglu, Daron Almost all democratic societies evolved socially and politically out of authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes. These changes not only altered the allocation of economic resources in society but also the structure of political power. In this paper, we develop a framework for studying the dynamics of political and social change. The society consists of agents that care about current and future social arrangements and economic allocations; allocation of political power determines who has the capacity to implement changes in economic allocations and future allocations of power. The set of available social rules and allocations at any point in time is stochastic. We show that political and social change may happen without any stochastic shocks or as a result of a shock destabilizing an otherwise stable social arrangement. Crucially, the process of social change is contingent (and history-dependent): the timing and sequence of stochastic events determine the long-run equilibrium social arrangements. For example, the extent of democratization may depend on how early uncertainty about the set of feasible reforms in the future is resolved. 2012-07-26T18:05:34Z 2012-07-26T18:05:34Z 2011-12 2011-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0027-8424 1091-6490 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/71844 Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov, and K. Sonin. “Colloquium Paper: Political Model of Social Evolution.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108.Supplement_4 (2011): 21292–21296. Copyright ©2011 by the National Academy of Sciences https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1019454108 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America PNAS |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron Egorov, Georgy Sonin, Konstantin Political model of social evolution |
| title | Political model of social evolution |
| title_full | Political model of social evolution |
| title_fullStr | Political model of social evolution |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political model of social evolution |
| title_short | Political model of social evolution |
| title_sort | political model of social evolution |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/71844 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
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