The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emis...

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Main Authors: Schmalensee, Richard, Stavins, Robert N.
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: MIT CEEPR 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007
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author Schmalensee, Richard
Stavins, Robert N.
author_facet Schmalensee, Richard
Stavins, Robert N.
author_sort Schmalensee, Richard
collection MIT
description Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.
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spelling mit-1721.1/720072019-04-10T20:00:44Z The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment Schmalensee, Richard Stavins, Robert N. Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. 2012-08-07T14:04:58Z 2012-08-07T14:04:58Z 2012-08 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007 CEEPR-WP-2012-012 en_US CEEPR Working Papers;2012-012 An error occurred on the license name. An error occurred getting the license - uri. application/pdf MIT CEEPR
spellingShingle Schmalensee, Richard
Stavins, Robert N.
The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title_full The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title_fullStr The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title_full_unstemmed The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title_short The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
title_sort so2 allowance trading system the ironic history of a grand policy experiment
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007
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