The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment
Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emis...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | en_US |
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MIT CEEPR
2012
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007 |
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author | Schmalensee, Richard Stavins, Robert N. |
author_facet | Schmalensee, Richard Stavins, Robert N. |
author_sort | Schmalensee, Richard |
collection | MIT |
description | Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:58:21Z |
format | Working Paper |
id | mit-1721.1/72007 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:58:21Z |
publishDate | 2012 |
publisher | MIT CEEPR |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/720072019-04-10T20:00:44Z The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment Schmalensee, Richard Stavins, Robert N. Two decades have passed Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system’s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away. 2012-08-07T14:04:58Z 2012-08-07T14:04:58Z 2012-08 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007 CEEPR-WP-2012-012 en_US CEEPR Working Papers;2012-012 An error occurred on the license name. An error occurred getting the license - uri. application/pdf MIT CEEPR |
spellingShingle | Schmalensee, Richard Stavins, Robert N. The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title | The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title_full | The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title_fullStr | The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title_full_unstemmed | The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title_short | The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment |
title_sort | so2 allowance trading system the ironic history of a grand policy experiment |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72007 |
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