Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the new cons...
Main Authors: | Acemoglu, Daron, Egorov, Georgy, Sonin, Konstantin |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2012
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72166 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
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