Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Singapore, December 11-14, 2011.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Springer Berlin/Heidelberg
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72532 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 |
| _version_ | 1826198671849422848 |
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| author | Daskalakis, Constantinos Pierrakos, George |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Daskalakis, Constantinos Pierrakos, George |
| author_sort | Daskalakis, Constantinos |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Singapore, December 11-14, 2011. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:08:20Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/72532 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:08:20Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | Springer Berlin/Heidelberg |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/725322022-10-01T01:29:21Z Simple, optimal and efficient auctions Daskalakis, Constantinos Pierrakos, George Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Daskalakis, Constantinos Daskalakis, Constantinos Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Singapore, December 11-14, 2011. We study the extent to which simple auctions can simultaneously achieve good revenue and efficiency guarantees in single-item settings. Motivated by the optimality of the second price auction with monopoly reserves when the bidders’ values are drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions [12], and its approximate optimality when they are drawn from independent regular distributions [11], we focus our attention to the second price auction with general (not necessarily monopoly) reserve prices, arguably one of the simplest and most intuitive auction formats. As our main result, we show that for a carefully chosen set of reserve prices this auction guarantees at least 20% of both the optimal welfare and the optimal revenue, when the bidders’ values are distributed according to independent, not necessarily identical, regular distributions. We also prove a similar guarantee, when the values are drawn i.i.d. from a—possibly irregular—distribution. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (award CCF-0953960) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-1101491) 2012-09-05T18:57:41Z 2012-09-05T18:57:41Z 2011-11 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 978-3-642-25509-0 0302-9743 1611-3349 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72532 Daskalakis, Constantinos, and George Pierrakos. “Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctions.” Internet and Network Economics. Ed. Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, & Elias Koutsoupias. Vol. 7090. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. 109-121. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 en_US http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_10 Internet and Network Economics Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Springer Berlin/Heidelberg MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Daskalakis, Constantinos Pierrakos, George Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title | Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title_full | Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title_fullStr | Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title_short | Simple, optimal and efficient auctions |
| title_sort | simple optimal and efficient auctions |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72532 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT daskalakisconstantinos simpleoptimalandefficientauctions AT pierrakosgeorge simpleoptimalandefficientauctions |