Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of goods to buyers, in order to maximize revenue. In a Bayesian setting the buyers' valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution D, which is often assumed to be known by the seller. I...
| Huvudupphovsmän: | , , |
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| Materialtyp: | Artikel |
| Språk: | en_US |
| Publicerad: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
2012
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| Länkar: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72693 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9156-2428 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |