Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions
We investigate the problem of optimal mechanism design, where an auctioneer wants to sell a set of goods to buyers, in order to maximize revenue. In a Bayesian setting the buyers' valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution D, which is often assumed to be known by the seller. I...
Main Authors: | Azar, Pablo Daniel, Chen, Jing, Micali, Silvio |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
2012
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72693 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9156-2428 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
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