Bargaining in Stationary Networks
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement li...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73022 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7436-2800 |
| _version_ | 1826207226536132608 |
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| author | Manea, Mihai |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Manea, Mihai |
| author_sort | Manea, Mihai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts—mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios—provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players. Characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:46:01Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/73022 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:46:01Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/730222022-09-28T16:00:59Z Bargaining in Stationary Networks Manea, Mihai Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Manea, Mihai Manea, Mihai We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts—mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios—provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players. Characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained. 2012-09-17T19:14:52Z 2012-09-17T19:14:52Z 2011-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73022 Manea, Mihai. “Bargaining in Stationary Networks.” American Economic Review 101.5 (2011): 2042–2080. Web. © 2011 American Economic Association. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7436-2800 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.2042 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Manea, Mihai Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title | Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title_full | Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title_fullStr | Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title_short | Bargaining in Stationary Networks |
| title_sort | bargaining in stationary networks |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73022 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7436-2800 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT maneamihai bargaininginstationarynetworks |