Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when t...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73093 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6105-617X |
| _version_ | 1811087176850472960 |
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| author | Duflo, Esther Dupas, Pascaline Kremer, Michael |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Duflo, Esther Dupas, Pascaline Kremer, Michael |
| author_sort | Duflo, Esther |
| collection | MIT |
| description | To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15) |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:41:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/73093 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:41:17Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/730932022-09-28T15:30:53Z Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya Duflo, Esther Dupas, Pascaline Kremer, Michael Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Duflo, Esther To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15) 2012-09-21T12:46:52Z 2012-09-21T12:46:52Z 2011-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73093 Duflo, Esther, Pascaline Dupas, and Michael Kremer. “Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya.” American Economic Review 101.5 (2011): 1739–1774. © 2011 AEA https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6105-617X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.5.1739 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Duflo, Esther Dupas, Pascaline Kremer, Michael Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title | Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title_full | Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title_fullStr | Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title_full_unstemmed | Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title_short | Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya |
| title_sort | peer effects teacher incentives and the impact of tracking evidence from a randomized evaluation in kenya |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73093 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6105-617X |
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