Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral hazard. Using a model of plan choice and me...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
American Economic Association
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73884 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9941-6684 |
| Summary: | We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that
individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral
( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral
hazard. Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of
heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implica-
tions. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection
on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with
introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. |
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