Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral hazard. Using a model of plan choice and me...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
American Economic Association
2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73884 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9941-6684 |
| _version_ | 1826199216256450560 |
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| author | Einav, Liran Finkelstein, Amy Ryan, Stephen Schrimpf, Paul Cullen, Mark R. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Einav, Liran Finkelstein, Amy Ryan, Stephen Schrimpf, Paul Cullen, Mark R. |
| author_sort | Einav, Liran |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that
individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral
( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral
hazard. Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of
heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implica-
tions. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection
on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with
introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:16:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/73884 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:16:33Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/738842022-09-27T18:20:41Z Selection on moral hazard in health insurance Einav, Liran Finkelstein, Amy Ryan, Stephen Schrimpf, Paul Cullen, Mark R. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Finkelstein, Amy Finkelstein, Amy We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral hazard. Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implica- tions. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. National Institute on Aging (NIA (R01 AG032449)) National Cancer Institute (U.S.) (Grant SES-0643037) United States. Social Security Administration (grant #5 RRC08098400-03-00) Aluminum Company of America Alfred P. Sloan Foundation John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Network on Socioeconomic Status and Health) 2012-10-11T17:52:47Z 2012-10-11T17:52:47Z 2013-02 2012-03 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73884 Einav, Liran et al. "Selection on moral hazard in health insurance." American Economic Review, 103(1): 178-219. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9941-6684 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.178 American Economic Review Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf American Economic Association MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Einav, Liran Finkelstein, Amy Ryan, Stephen Schrimpf, Paul Cullen, Mark R. Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title | Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title_full | Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title_fullStr | Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title_full_unstemmed | Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title_short | Selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| title_sort | selection on moral hazard in health insurance |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73884 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9941-6684 |
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