Securing computation against continuous leakage

30th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. Proceedings

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Goldwasser, Shafi, Rothblum, Guy N.
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73956
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535
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author Goldwasser, Shafi
Rothblum, Guy N.
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Goldwasser, Shafi
Rothblum, Guy N.
author_sort Goldwasser, Shafi
collection MIT
description 30th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. Proceedings
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spelling mit-1721.1/739562022-09-30T15:53:09Z Securing computation against continuous leakage Goldwasser, Shafi Rothblum, Guy N. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Goldwasser, Shafi 30th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. Proceedings We present a general method to compile any cryptographic algorithm into one which resists side channel attacks of the only computation leaks information variety for an unbounded number of executions. Our method uses as a building block a semantically secure subsidiary bit encryption scheme with the following additional operations: key refreshing, oblivious generation of cipher texts, leakage resilience re-generation, and blinded homomorphic evaluation of one single complete gate (e.g. NAND). Furthermore, the security properties of the subsidiary encryption scheme should withstand bounded leakage incurred while performing each of the above operations. We show how to implement such a subsidiary encryption scheme under the DDH intractability assumption and the existence of a simple secure hardware component. The hardware component is independent of the encryption scheme secret key. The subsidiary encryption scheme resists leakage attacks where the leakage is computable in polynomial time and of length bounded by a constant fraction of the security parameter. Israel Science Foundation (710267) United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (710613) National Science Foundation (U.S.) (6914349) Weizmann KAMAR Grant 2012-10-15T14:27:07Z 2012-10-15T14:27:07Z 2010-08 2010-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 978-3-642-14622-0 0302-9743 1611-3349 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73956 Goldwasser, Shafi, and Guy N. Rothblum. “Securing Computation Against Continuous Leakage.” Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. Ed. Tal Rabin. LNCS Vol. 6223. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. 59–79. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_4 Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010 Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Springer Berlin / Heidelberg MIT web domain
spellingShingle Goldwasser, Shafi
Rothblum, Guy N.
Securing computation against continuous leakage
title Securing computation against continuous leakage
title_full Securing computation against continuous leakage
title_fullStr Securing computation against continuous leakage
title_full_unstemmed Securing computation against continuous leakage
title_short Securing computation against continuous leakage
title_sort securing computation against continuous leakage
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/73956
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535
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