When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dia...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2004
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7403 |
| _version_ | 1826203024934043648 |
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| author | de Figueiredo, John Kim, James |
| author_facet | de Figueiredo, John Kim, James |
| author_sort | de Figueiredo, John |
| collection | MIT |
| description | This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions
for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on
the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific
and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However,
when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more
likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:30:30Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/7403 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:30:30Z |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/74032019-04-10T23:12:16Z When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission de Figueiredo, John Kim, James Lobbying Transaction Cost Economics, Appropriability Telecommunications This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC. 2004-12-10T19:16:36Z 2004-12-10T19:16:36Z 2004-12-10T19:16:36Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7403 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4483-04 206718 bytes application/pdf application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Lobbying Transaction Cost Economics, Appropriability Telecommunications de Figueiredo, John Kim, James When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title | When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_full | When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_fullStr | When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_full_unstemmed | When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_short | When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission |
| title_sort | when do firms hire lobbyists the organization of lobbying at the federal communications commission |
| topic | Lobbying Transaction Cost Economics, Appropriability Telecommunications |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7403 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT defigueiredojohn whendofirmshirelobbyiststheorganizationoflobbyingatthefederalcommunicationscommission AT kimjames whendofirmshirelobbyiststheorganizationoflobbyingatthefederalcommunicationscommission |