New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange

The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ashlagi, Itai, Roth, Alvin E.
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: American Economic Association 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
_version_ 1826199053869776896
author Ashlagi, Itai
Roth, Alvin E.
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Ashlagi, Itai
Roth, Alvin E.
author_sort Ashlagi, Itai
collection MIT
description The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to-match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the incentives for hospitals to enroll all pairs in kidney exchange can be achieved, and how the concentration of hard to match pairs increases the importance of long, non-simultaneous nondirected donor chains.
first_indexed 2024-09-23T11:14:00Z
format Article
id mit-1721.1/74595
institution Massachusetts Institute of Technology
language en_US
last_indexed 2024-09-23T11:14:00Z
publishDate 2012
publisher American Economic Association
record_format dspace
spelling mit-1721.1/745952022-10-01T02:14:36Z New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin E. Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to-match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the incentives for hospitals to enroll all pairs in kidney exchange can be achieved, and how the concentration of hard to match pairs increases the importance of long, non-simultaneous nondirected donor chains. 2012-11-08T15:16:36Z 2012-11-08T15:16:36Z 2012-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595 Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. 2012. "New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange." American Economic Review, 102(3): 354-59. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.354 American Economic Review Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf American Economic Association Other University Web Domain
spellingShingle Ashlagi, Itai
Roth, Alvin E.
New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title_full New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title_fullStr New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title_full_unstemmed New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title_short New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
title_sort new challenges in multihospital kidney exchange
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X
work_keys_str_mv AT ashlagiitai newchallengesinmultihospitalkidneyexchange
AT rothalvine newchallengesinmultihospitalkidneyexchange