New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to...
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Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2012
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
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author | Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin E. |
author2 | Sloan School of Management |
author_facet | Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin E. |
author_sort | Ashlagi, Itai |
collection | MIT |
description | The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to-match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the incentives for hospitals to enroll all pairs in kidney exchange can be achieved, and how the concentration of hard to match pairs increases the importance of long, non-simultaneous nondirected donor chains. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:14:00Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/74595 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:14:00Z |
publishDate | 2012 |
publisher | American Economic Association |
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spelling | mit-1721.1/745952022-10-01T02:14:36Z New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin E. Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to-match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the incentives for hospitals to enroll all pairs in kidney exchange can be achieved, and how the concentration of hard to match pairs increases the importance of long, non-simultaneous nondirected donor chains. 2012-11-08T15:16:36Z 2012-11-08T15:16:36Z 2012-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595 Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. 2012. "New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange." American Economic Review, 102(3): 354-59. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.354 American Economic Review Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf American Economic Association Other University Web Domain |
spellingShingle | Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin E. New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title | New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title_full | New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title_fullStr | New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title_full_unstemmed | New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title_short | New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange |
title_sort | new challenges in multihospital kidney exchange |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/74595 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ashlagiitai newchallengesinmultihospitalkidneyexchange AT rothalvine newchallengesinmultihospitalkidneyexchange |