Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities

A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed unders...

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Main Authors: Gibbons, Robert S., Henderson, Rebecca
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75010
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6765-3039
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author Gibbons, Robert S.
Henderson, Rebecca
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Gibbons, Robert S.
Henderson, Rebecca
author_sort Gibbons, Robert S.
collection MIT
description A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build.
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spelling mit-1721.1/750102022-10-01T13:45:29Z Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities Gibbons, Robert S. Henderson, Rebecca Sloan School of Management Gibbons, Robert S. A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build. 2012-11-26T17:36:46Z 2012-11-26T17:36:46Z 2011-12 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1047-7039 1526-5455 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75010 Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. “Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities.” Organization Science 23.5 (2011): 1350–1364. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6765-3039 en_US http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1287/orsc.1110.0715 Organization Science Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) MIT web domain
spellingShingle Gibbons, Robert S.
Henderson, Rebecca
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title_full Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title_fullStr Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title_full_unstemmed Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title_short Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
title_sort relational contracts and organizational capabilities
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/75010
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6765-3039
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