On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels

We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also sho...

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Main Authors: Pirandola, Stefano, Braunstein, Samuel L., Lloyd, Seth
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Springer-Verlag 2013
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087
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author Pirandola, Stefano
Braunstein, Samuel L.
Lloyd, Seth
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering
Pirandola, Stefano
Braunstein, Samuel L.
Lloyd, Seth
author_sort Pirandola, Stefano
collection MIT
description We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners.
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spelling mit-1721.1/790872022-09-29T12:32:51Z On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners. Marie Curie International Fellowship W. M. Keck Foundation 2013-06-10T19:35:44Z 2013-06-10T19:35:44Z 2009 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 978-3-642-10697-2 978-3-642-10698-9 0302-9743 1611-3349 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087 Pirandola, Stefano, Samuel L. Braunstein, and Seth Lloyd. On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels. Springer-Verlag, 2009. en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10698-9_5 Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Springer-Verlag arXiv
spellingShingle Pirandola, Stefano
Braunstein, Samuel L.
Lloyd, Seth
On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title_full On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title_fullStr On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title_full_unstemmed On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title_short On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
title_sort on the security and degradability of gaussian channels
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087
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