On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels
We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also sho...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
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Springer-Verlag
2013
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087 |
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author | Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth |
author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering |
author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth |
author_sort | Pirandola, Stefano |
collection | MIT |
description | We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:05:07Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/79087 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:05:07Z |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | Springer-Verlag |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/790872022-09-29T12:32:51Z On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth We consider the notion of canonical attacks, which are the cryptographic analog of the canonical forms of a one-mode Gaussian channel. Using this notion, we explore the connections between the degradability properties of the channel and its security for quantum key distribution. Finally, we also show some relations between canonical attacks and optimal Gaussian cloners. Marie Curie International Fellowship W. M. Keck Foundation 2013-06-10T19:35:44Z 2013-06-10T19:35:44Z 2009 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 978-3-642-10697-2 978-3-642-10698-9 0302-9743 1611-3349 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087 Pirandola, Stefano, Samuel L. Braunstein, and Seth Lloyd. On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels. Springer-Verlag, 2009. en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10698-9_5 Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Springer-Verlag arXiv |
spellingShingle | Pirandola, Stefano Braunstein, Samuel L. Lloyd, Seth On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title | On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title_full | On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title_fullStr | On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title_full_unstemmed | On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title_short | On the Security and Degradability of Gaussian Channels |
title_sort | on the security and degradability of gaussian channels |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79087 |
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