Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment

We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer...

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Main Authors: Werning, Ivan, Farhi, Emmanuel, Sleet, Christopher, Yeltekin, Sevin
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Oxford University Press 2013
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82875
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575
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author Werning, Ivan
Farhi, Emmanuel
Sleet, Christopher
Yeltekin, Sevin
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Werning, Ivan
Farhi, Emmanuel
Sleet, Christopher
Yeltekin, Sevin
author_sort Werning, Ivan
collection MIT
description We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.
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spelling mit-1721.1/828752022-09-28T16:20:36Z Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment Werning, Ivan Farhi, Emmanuel Sleet, Christopher Yeltekin, Sevin Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Werning, Ivan We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates. 2013-12-09T13:13:23Z 2013-12-09T13:13:23Z 2012-01 2011-10 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0034-6527 1467-937X http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82875 Farhi, E., C. Sleet, I. Werning, and S. Yeltekin. “Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment.” The Review of Economic Studies 79, no. 4 (October 18, 2012): 1469-1493. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds001 The Review of Economic Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press Other univ. web domain
spellingShingle Werning, Ivan
Farhi, Emmanuel
Sleet, Christopher
Yeltekin, Sevin
Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title_full Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title_fullStr Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title_full_unstemmed Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title_short Nonlinear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
title_sort nonlinear capital taxation without commitment
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82875
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575
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