Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity

We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specificatio...

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Main Authors: Farhi, Emmanuel, Werning, Ivan
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: American Economic Association 2013
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575
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author Farhi, Emmanuel
Werning, Ivan
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Farhi, Emmanuel
Werning, Ivan
author_sort Farhi, Emmanuel
collection MIT
description We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries.
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spelling mit-1721.1/828762022-10-25T05:44:51Z Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity Farhi, Emmanuel Werning, Ivan Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Werning, Ivan We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries. 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z 2013-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876 Farhi, Emmanuel, and Ivan Werning. “Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity.” American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (May 2013): 489-495. © 2013 by the American Economic Association https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.3.489 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association
spellingShingle Farhi, Emmanuel
Werning, Ivan
Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title_full Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title_fullStr Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title_full_unstemmed Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title_short Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
title_sort estate taxation with altruism heterogeneity
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575
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