Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity
We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specificatio...
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American Economic Association
2013
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575 |
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author | Farhi, Emmanuel Werning, Ivan |
author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Farhi, Emmanuel Werning, Ivan |
author_sort | Farhi, Emmanuel |
collection | MIT |
description | We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:00:21Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/82876 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:00:21Z |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | American Economic Association |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/828762022-10-25T05:44:51Z Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity Farhi, Emmanuel Werning, Ivan Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Werning, Ivan We develop a theory of optimal estate taxation in a model where bequest inequality is driven by differences in parental altruism. We show that a wide range of results are possible, from positive taxes to subsidies. The results depend on redistributive objectives implicit in the cardinal specification of utility and social welfare functions. We propose a normalization that is helpful in classifying these different possibilities. We isolate cases where the optimal policy bans negative bequests and taxes positive bequests, features present in most advanced countries. 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z 2013-12-09T13:20:19Z 2013-05 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 1944-7981 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876 Farhi, Emmanuel, and Ivan Werning. “Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity.” American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (May 2013): 489-495. © 2013 by the American Economic Association https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.3.489 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
spellingShingle | Farhi, Emmanuel Werning, Ivan Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title | Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title_full | Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title_fullStr | Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title_full_unstemmed | Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title_short | Estate Taxation with Altruism Heterogeneity |
title_sort | estate taxation with altruism heterogeneity |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82876 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2370-5575 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT farhiemmanuel estatetaxationwithaltruismheterogeneity AT werningivan estatetaxationwithaltruismheterogeneity |