Public Disagreement
We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is eventually...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2013
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82895 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 |
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| author | Sethi, Rajiv Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Sethi, Rajiv Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author_sort | Sethi, Rajiv |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is eventually aggregated and public beliefs are identical to those arising under observable priors. When priors are independently distributed, however, some private information is never revealed, and communication breaks down entirely in large groups. Interpreting integration in terms of the observability of priors, we show how increases in social integration lead to less divergent public beliefs on average. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:56:16Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/82895 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:56:16Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/828952022-10-05T04:46:18Z Public Disagreement Sethi, Rajiv Yildiz, Muhamet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Yildiz, Muhamet We develop a model of deliberation under heterogeneous beliefs and incomplete information, and use it to explore questions concerning the aggregation of distributed information and the consequences of social integration. We show that when priors are correlated, all private information is eventually aggregated and public beliefs are identical to those arising under observable priors. When priors are independently distributed, however, some private information is never revealed, and communication breaks down entirely in large groups. Interpreting integration in terms of the observability of priors, we show how increases in social integration lead to less divergent public beliefs on average. Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, N.J.) 2013-12-09T21:19:16Z 2013-12-09T21:19:16Z 2012-08 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1945-7669 1945-7685 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82895 Sethi, Rajiv, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Public Disagreement.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 3 (August 2012): 57-95. Copyright 2012 American Economic Association. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.3.57 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Sethi, Rajiv Yildiz, Muhamet Public Disagreement |
| title | Public Disagreement |
| title_full | Public Disagreement |
| title_fullStr | Public Disagreement |
| title_full_unstemmed | Public Disagreement |
| title_short | Public Disagreement |
| title_sort | public disagreement |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82895 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sethirajiv publicdisagreement AT yildizmuhamet publicdisagreement |