Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware
We consider general program obfuscation mechanisms using “somewhat trusted” hardware devices, with the goal of minimizing the usage of the hardware, its complexity, and the required trust. Specifically, our solution has the following properties: (i) The obfuscation remains secure even if all the...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
2014
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86914 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535 |
| _version_ | 1826212923519795200 |
|---|---|
| author | Bitansky, Nir Canetti, Ran Goldwasser, Shafi Halevi, Shai Kalai, Yael Tauman Rothblum, Guy N. |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Bitansky, Nir Canetti, Ran Goldwasser, Shafi Halevi, Shai Kalai, Yael Tauman Rothblum, Guy N. |
| author_sort | Bitansky, Nir |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We consider general program obfuscation mechanisms using “somewhat trusted” hardware devices, with the goal of minimizing the usage of the hardware, its complexity, and the required trust. Specifically, our solution has the following properties:
(i) The obfuscation remains secure even if all the hardware devices in use are leaky. That is, the adversary can obtain the result of evaluating any function on the local state of the device, as long as this function has short output. In addition the adversary also controls the communication between the devices.
(ii) The number of hardware devices used in an obfuscation and the amount of work they perform are polynomial in the security parameter independently of the obfuscated function’s complexity.
(iii) A (universal) set of hardware components, owned by the user, is initialized only once and from that point on can be used with multiple “software-based” obfuscations sent by different vendors. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:40:38Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/86914 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:40:38Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/869142022-09-29T15:23:24Z Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware Bitansky, Nir Canetti, Ran Goldwasser, Shafi Halevi, Shai Kalai, Yael Tauman Rothblum, Guy N. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Goldwasser, Shafi We consider general program obfuscation mechanisms using “somewhat trusted” hardware devices, with the goal of minimizing the usage of the hardware, its complexity, and the required trust. Specifically, our solution has the following properties: (i) The obfuscation remains secure even if all the hardware devices in use are leaky. That is, the adversary can obtain the result of evaluating any function on the local state of the device, as long as this function has short output. In addition the adversary also controls the communication between the devices. (ii) The number of hardware devices used in an obfuscation and the amount of work they perform are polynomial in the security parameter independently of the obfuscated function’s complexity. (iii) A (universal) set of hardware components, owned by the user, is initialized only once and from that point on can be used with multiple “software-based” obfuscations sent by different vendors. European Commission (Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant) Israel Science Foundation (Grant) Check Point Institute for Information Security National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF grant CCF-0832797) Computing Research Association (Computing Innovation Fellowship) 2014-05-09T16:54:23Z 2014-05-09T16:54:23Z 2011 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 978-3-642-25384-3 978-3-642-25385-0 0302-9743 1611-3349 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86914 Bitansky, Nir, Ran Canetti, Shafi Goldwasser, Shai Halevi, Yael Tauman Kalai, and Guy N. Rothblum. “Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware.” Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; volume 7073) (2011): 722–739. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_39 Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2011 Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg Other repository |
| spellingShingle | Bitansky, Nir Canetti, Ran Goldwasser, Shafi Halevi, Shai Kalai, Yael Tauman Rothblum, Guy N. Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title | Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title_full | Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title_fullStr | Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title_full_unstemmed | Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title_short | Program Obfuscation with Leaky Hardware |
| title_sort | program obfuscation with leaky hardware |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/86914 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-1535 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bitanskynir programobfuscationwithleakyhardware AT canettiran programobfuscationwithleakyhardware AT goldwassershafi programobfuscationwithleakyhardware AT halevishai programobfuscationwithleakyhardware AT kalaiyaeltauman programobfuscationwithleakyhardware AT rothblumguyn programobfuscationwithleakyhardware |