Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress
We analyze how firms renegotiate labor contracts to extract concessions from labor. While anecdotal evidence suggests that firms tend to renegotiate wages downward in times of financial distress, there is no empirical evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude. T...
Main Authors: | Benmelech, Efraim, Bergman, Nittai, Enriquez, Ricardo J. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies
2014
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87605 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6486-333X |
Similar Items
-
Credit Traps
by: Benmelech, Efraim, et al.
Published: (2014) -
Vintage Capital and Creditor Protection
by: Benmelech, Efraim, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Collateral pricing
by: Benmelech, Efraim, et al.
Published: (2010) -
Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel
by: Benmelech, Efraim, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Essays in Labor Economics
by: Enriquez, Brandon
Published: (2024)