Matching with couples revisited
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of cou...
Main Authors: | Ashlagi, Itai, Braverman, Mark, Hassidim, Avinatan |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery
2014
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87606 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
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