Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has alr...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Association for Computing Machinery
2014
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87607 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
| _version_ | 1826211837066084352 |
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| author | Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin |
| author2 | Sloan School of Management |
| author_facet | Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin |
| author_sort | Ashlagi, Itai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed.
We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:12:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/87607 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:12:10Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/876072022-10-02T01:19:11Z Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin Sloan School of Management Ashlagi, Itai As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism. National Science Foundation (U.S.) 2014-06-02T17:31:25Z 2014-06-02T17:31:25Z 2011-06 2011-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper 9781450302616 1544-5372 1544-5380 NBER working paper: 16720 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87607 Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin Roth. “Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange. [Extended Abstract]” Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC ’11 (2011), June 5-9. 2011, San Jose, California, USA. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993625 Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC '11 Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Association for Computing Machinery NBER |
| spellingShingle | Ashlagi, Itai Roth, Alvin Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_full | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_fullStr | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_full_unstemmed | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_short | Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange |
| title_sort | individual rationality and participation in large scale multi hospital kidney exchange |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87607 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2124-738X |
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