Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio
This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research – filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem – in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization sha...
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Language: | en_US |
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University of Chicago Press
2014
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88015 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7570-8044 |
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author | Gans, Joshua Samuel Murray, Fiona E. |
author2 | Sloan School of Management |
author_facet | Sloan School of Management Gans, Joshua Samuel Murray, Fiona E. |
author_sort | Gans, Joshua Samuel |
collection | MIT |
description | This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research – filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem – in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence. In making our argument, we begin by reviewing project selection criteria and policies towards disclosure and commercialization (including patent rights) made by major funding organizations, noting the great variation between these institutions. We then provide a model of how selection criteria and funding conditions imposed by funders interact with the preferences of scientists to shape those projects that accept public funds and the overall level of openness in research. Our analysis reveals complex and unexpected relationships between public funding, private funding, and public disclosure of research. We show, for example, that funding choices made by public agencies can lead to unintended, paradoxical effects, providing short-term openness while stifling longer-term innovation. Implications for empirical evaluation and an agenda for future research are discussed. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:38:12Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/88015 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:38:12Z |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | University of Chicago Press |
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spelling | mit-1721.1/880152022-09-29T15:09:57Z Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio Gans, Joshua Samuel Murray, Fiona E. Sloan School of Management Murray, Fiona E. Gans, Joshua Samuel This paper examines argues that while two distinct perspectives characterize the foundations of the public funding of research – filling a selection gap and solving a disclosure problem – in fact both the selection choices of public funders and their criteria for disclosure and commercialization shape the level and type of funding for research and the disclosures that arise as a consequence. In making our argument, we begin by reviewing project selection criteria and policies towards disclosure and commercialization (including patent rights) made by major funding organizations, noting the great variation between these institutions. We then provide a model of how selection criteria and funding conditions imposed by funders interact with the preferences of scientists to shape those projects that accept public funds and the overall level of openness in research. Our analysis reveals complex and unexpected relationships between public funding, private funding, and public disclosure of research. We show, for example, that funding choices made by public agencies can lead to unintended, paradoxical effects, providing short-term openness while stifling longer-term innovation. Implications for empirical evaluation and an agenda for future research are discussed. National Science Foundation (U.S.) (NSF Grant #0738394) Australian Research Council (ARC Discovery grant) 2014-06-17T16:07:12Z 2014-06-17T16:07:12Z 2012-03 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 9780226473031 0226473031 NBER working paper no.16980 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88015 Gans, Joshua S. and Fiona Murray. "Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure and the Public-Private Portfolio." Chapter in NBER book The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited (2012), Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors. University of Chicago Press (March 2012). p. 51-103. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7570-8044 en_US http://fmurray.scripts.mit.edu/docs/GansMurray_Ch1_NBERRateDirection2012.pdf The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited (2012) Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf University of Chicago Press NBER |
spellingShingle | Gans, Joshua Samuel Murray, Fiona E. Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title | Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title_full | Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title_fullStr | Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title_full_unstemmed | Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title_short | Funding Scientific Knowledge: Selection, Disclosure, and the Public-Private Portfolio |
title_sort | funding scientific knowledge selection disclosure and the public private portfolio |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88015 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7570-8044 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gansjoshuasamuel fundingscientificknowledgeselectiondisclosureandthepublicprivateportfolio AT murrayfionae fundingscientificknowledgeselectiondisclosureandthepublicprivateportfolio |