The Internal Governance of Firms
We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. Ex...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
John Wiley & Sons, Inc
2014
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88023 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0813-4727 |
| Summary: | We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control. |
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