Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition

We analyze how asymmetric information and imperfect competition affect liquidity and asset prices. Our model has three periods: Agents are identical in the first, become heterogeneous and trade in the second, and consume asset payoffs in the third. We show that asymmetric information in the second p...

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Main Authors: Wang, Jiang, Vayanos, Dimitri
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Oxford University Press 2014
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88146
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8261-0261
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author Wang, Jiang
Vayanos, Dimitri
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Wang, Jiang
Vayanos, Dimitri
author_sort Wang, Jiang
collection MIT
description We analyze how asymmetric information and imperfect competition affect liquidity and asset prices. Our model has three periods: Agents are identical in the first, become heterogeneous and trade in the second, and consume asset payoffs in the third. We show that asymmetric information in the second period raises ex ante expected asset returns in the first, comparing both to the case where all private signals are made public and to that where private signals are not observed. Imperfect competition can instead lower expected returns. Each imperfection can move common measures of illiquidity in opposite directions.
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spelling mit-1721.1/881462022-09-23T13:58:25Z Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition Wang, Jiang Vayanos, Dimitri Sloan School of Management Wang, Jiang We analyze how asymmetric information and imperfect competition affect liquidity and asset prices. Our model has three periods: Agents are identical in the first, become heterogeneous and trade in the second, and consume asset payoffs in the third. We show that asymmetric information in the second period raises ex ante expected asset returns in the first, comparing both to the case where all private signals are made public and to that where private signals are not observed. Imperfect competition can instead lower expected returns. Each imperfection can move common measures of illiquidity in opposite directions. 2014-06-30T18:12:19Z 2014-06-30T18:12:19Z 2011-11 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0893-9454 1465-7368 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88146 Vayanos, D., and J. Wang. “Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition.” Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 5 (May 1, 2012): 1339–1365. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8261-0261 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr128 Review of Financial Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press Other repository
spellingShingle Wang, Jiang
Vayanos, Dimitri
Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title_full Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title_fullStr Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title_full_unstemmed Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title_short Liquidity and Asset Returns Under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition
title_sort liquidity and asset returns under asymmetric information and imperfect competition
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88146
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8261-0261
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AT vayanosdimitri liquidityandassetreturnsunderasymmetricinformationandimperfectcompetition