Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
Consider a seller who seeks to provide service to a collection of interested parties, subject to feasibility constraints on which parties may be simultaneously served. Assuming that a distribution is known on the value of each party for service—arguably a strong assumption—Myerson's seminal wor...
Main Authors: | Azar, Pablo Daniel, Micali, Silvio, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Daskalakis, Konstantinos |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
2014
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90403 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9156-2428 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
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