Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions

Consider a seller who seeks to provide service to a collection of interested parties, subject to feasibility constraints on which parties may be simultaneously served. Assuming that a distribution is known on the value of each party for service—arguably a strong assumption—Myerson's seminal wor...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Azar, Pablo Daniel, Micali, Silvio, Weinberg, S. Matthew, Daskalakis, Konstantinos
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 2014
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90403
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9156-2428
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064

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