Structure of extreme correlated equilibria: a zero-sum example and its implications
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite g...
Main Authors: | Parrilo, Pablo A., Stein, Noah Daniel, Ozdaglar, Asuman E. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Springer-Verlag
2014
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/90813 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1827-1285 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1132-8477 |
Similar Items
-
Pricing Equilibria and Graphical Valuations
by: Candogan, Utku Ozan, et al.
Published: (2019) -
Computing team-maxmin equilibria in zero-sum multiplayer games
by: Zhang, Youzhi
Published: (2020) -
The complexity of Nash equilibria in multiplayer zero-sum games and coordination games
by: Cai, Yang, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Published: (2011) -
Nash equilibria for non zero-sum ergodic stochastic differential games
by: Cohen, S, et al.
Published: (2017) -
Exchangeable equilibria
by: Stein, Noah D. (Noah Daniel)
Published: (2011)