Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance
Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase t...
Main Authors: | Duggan, Mark G., Gruber, Jonathan, Autor, David H. |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/95951 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9877-3065 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6915-9381 |
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