Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance
Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase t...
Main Authors: | Duggan, Mark G., Gruber, Jonathan, Autor, David H. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2015
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/95951 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9877-3065 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6915-9381 |
Similar Items
-
Moral hazard, insurers' non-performance and the captive alternative
by: Sonja Huber, et al.
Published: (2012-04-01) -
Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
by: Einav, Liran, et al.
Published: (2012) -
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
by: Michel Grignon, et al.
Published: (2018-09-01) -
Deterrence in private law
by: Steel, S
Published: (2022) -
Moral hazard and the impact of private health insurance on the utilisation of health care in Malaysia
by: Zurina Kefeli @ Zulkefli,, et al.
Published: (2012)