Testing for Asymmetric Information Using “Unused Observables” in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
This article tests for asymmetric information in the U.K. annuity market of the 1990s by trying to identify “unused observables,” attributes of individual insurance buyers that are correlated both with subsequent claims experience and with insurance demand but that insurance companies did not use to...
Main Authors: | Finkelstein, Amy, Poterba, James M. |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Risk and Insurance Association
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/95991 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3532-0998 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9941-6684 |
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