Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model
We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and infor...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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American Economic Association
2015
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96000 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
| _version_ | 1826191858783485952 |
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| author | Acemoglu, Daron Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, Daron |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited. Conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution: Bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake, and is thus uninformative of the opposing group's type. The agents then experiment with a good action, restarting the cycle. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:02:22Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/96000 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T09:02:22Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/960002022-09-30T12:58:21Z Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model Acemoglu, Daron Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Acemoglu, Daron We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of bad types who always take bad actions. Good actions may be misperceived as bad and information about past actions is limited. Conflict spirals start as a result of misperceptions but also contain the seeds of their own dissolution: Bayesian agents eventually conclude that the spiral likely started by mistake, and is thus uninformative of the opposing group's type. The agents then experiment with a good action, restarting the cycle. 2015-03-12T20:15:01Z 2015-03-12T20:15:01Z 2014-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0002-8282 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96000 Acemoglu, Daron, and Alexander Wolitzky. “ Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model.” American Economic Review 104, no. 4 (April 2014): 1350–1367. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1350 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron Wolitzky, Alexander Greenberg Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title | Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title_full | Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title_fullStr | Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title_short | Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model |
| title_sort | cycles of conflict an economic model |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96000 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0908-7491 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron cyclesofconflictaneconomicmodel AT wolitzkyalexandergreenberg cyclesofconflictaneconomicmodel |