A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets
We develop a model for studying dynamic competition in environments with frictions that lead to partial lock-in of customers to products. The dynamic aspects associated with customer retention and acquisition introduce pricing incentives that do not exist in more traditional, static product markets....
Main Authors: | Einav, Liran, Somaini, Paulo Jose |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Wiley Blackwell
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/96159 |
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