Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race

Josh Glasgow’s book A Theory of Race (2009) presents an important argument for the claim that race is an illusion and, that racial claims are, strictly speaking, false. They are false because the concept of race, according to Glasgow, makes a non-negotiable commitment to races being biologically bas...

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Main Author: Haslanger, Sally
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: 2015
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97037
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author Haslanger, Sally
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Haslanger, Sally
author_sort Haslanger, Sally
collection MIT
description Josh Glasgow’s book A Theory of Race (2009) presents an important argument for the claim that race is an illusion and, that racial claims are, strictly speaking, false. They are false because the concept of race, according to Glasgow, makes a non-negotiable commitment to races being biologically based kinds, or at least to races not being wholly social kinds. Although Glasgow considers empirical evidence for this commitment (Ch 4), the data is inconclusive; instead he relies on a traditional method of thought experiment to argue that wholly social analyses fail to capture our intuitions (§6.2). Glasgow supports a reconstructionist approach which would have us adopt a family of concepts related to race, viz., race* concepts. Race*s are very much like races, except that it is not part of the concept of race* that race*s are biological kinds. (I take it that in ordinary circumstances post-reconstruction the terms ‘race’ and ‘race*’ are to be pronounced the same and spelled the same, but as we pre-reconstructionists consider the reconstructionist proposal, we use the ‘*’ to keep our meanings differentiated (139-40).
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spelling mit-1721.1/970372022-10-01T00:16:36Z Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race Haslanger, Sally Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Haslanger, Sally Haslanger, Sally Josh Glasgow’s book A Theory of Race (2009) presents an important argument for the claim that race is an illusion and, that racial claims are, strictly speaking, false. They are false because the concept of race, according to Glasgow, makes a non-negotiable commitment to races being biologically based kinds, or at least to races not being wholly social kinds. Although Glasgow considers empirical evidence for this commitment (Ch 4), the data is inconclusive; instead he relies on a traditional method of thought experiment to argue that wholly social analyses fail to capture our intuitions (§6.2). Glasgow supports a reconstructionist approach which would have us adopt a family of concepts related to race, viz., race* concepts. Race*s are very much like races, except that it is not part of the concept of race* that race*s are biological kinds. (I take it that in ordinary circumstances post-reconstruction the terms ‘race’ and ‘race*’ are to be pronounced the same and spelled the same, but as we pre-reconstructionists consider the reconstructionist proposal, we use the ‘*’ to keep our meanings differentiated (139-40). 2015-05-20T14:44:22Z 2015-05-20T14:44:22Z 2009 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97037 Haslanger, Sally. "Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race." Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 2009). en_US http://web.mit.edu/sgrp/2009/no2/Haslanger1009.pdf Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf Haslanger
spellingShingle Haslanger, Sally
Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title_full Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title_fullStr Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title_full_unstemmed Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title_short Exploring Race in Life, in Speech, and in Philosophy: Comments on Joshua Glasgow’s A Theory of Race
title_sort exploring race in life in speech and in philosophy comments on joshua glasgow s a theory of race
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97037
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