Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography
The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornersto...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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American Physical Society
2015
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98020 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X |
| _version_ | 1811087940899569664 |
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| author | Sun, Shi-Hai Xu, Feihu Jiang, Mu-Sheng Ma, Xiang-Chun Lo, Hoi-Kwong Liang, Lin-Mei |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Sun, Shi-Hai Xu, Feihu Jiang, Mu-Sheng Ma, Xiang-Chun Lo, Hoi-Kwong Liang, Lin-Mei |
| author_sort | Sun, Shi-Hai |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak-coherent-state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV) QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:54:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/98020 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:54:15Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | American Physical Society |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/980202022-09-28T16:56:40Z Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography Sun, Shi-Hai Xu, Feihu Jiang, Mu-Sheng Ma, Xiang-Chun Lo, Hoi-Kwong Liang, Lin-Mei Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Xu, Feihu The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptography. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV) quantum communication protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak-coherent-state blind quantum computing, and so on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers, by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV) QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption, other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of CV-QKD. National Natural Science Foundation (China) (Grant 11304391) 2015-08-05T11:38:34Z 2015-08-05T11:38:34Z 2015-08 2015-01 2015-08-04T22:00:10Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1050-2947 1094-1622 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98020 Sun, Shi-Hai, Feihu Xu, Mu-Sheng Jiang, Xiang-Chun Ma, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Lin-Mei Liang. "Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography." Phys. Rev. A 92, 022304 (August 2015). © 2015 American Physical Society https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X en http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.92.022304 Physical Review A Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. American Physical Society application/pdf American Physical Society American Physical Society |
| spellingShingle | Sun, Shi-Hai Xu, Feihu Jiang, Mu-Sheng Ma, Xiang-Chun Lo, Hoi-Kwong Liang, Lin-Mei Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title | Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title_full | Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title_fullStr | Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title_full_unstemmed | Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title_short | Effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| title_sort | effect of source tampering in the security of quantum cryptography |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98020 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X |
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