Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions
Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) of strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by strategic bidders. However, 22.4% of targets in our sample are valued higher by financial bidders. These are...
Main Authors: | Gorbenko, Alexander S., Malenko, Andrey |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
American Finance Association/Wiley
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98906 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6429-850X |
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