Privacy Regulation and Market Structure

This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Theref...

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Main Authors: Campbell, James, Goldfarb, Avi, Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:en_US
Published: Wiley Blackwell 2015
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832
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author Campbell, James
Goldfarb, Avi
Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Campbell, James
Goldfarb, Avi
Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
author_sort Campbell, James
collection MIT
description This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet.
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spelling mit-1721.1/991732022-09-29T15:00:13Z Privacy Regulation and Market Structure Campbell, James Goldfarb, Avi Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth Sloan School of Management Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet. 2015-10-06T19:36:56Z 2015-10-06T19:36:56Z 2015-02 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 10586407 1530-9134 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173 Campbell, James, Avi Goldfarb, and Catherine Tucker. “Privacy Regulation and Market Structure.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 1 (February 10, 2015): 47–73. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12079 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Wiley Blackwell SSRN
spellingShingle Campbell, James
Goldfarb, Avi
Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title_full Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title_fullStr Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title_full_unstemmed Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title_short Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
title_sort privacy regulation and market structure
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832
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