Privacy Regulation and Market Structure
This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Theref...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
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Wiley Blackwell
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832 |
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author | Campbell, James Goldfarb, Avi Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth |
author2 | Sloan School of Management |
author_facet | Sloan School of Management Campbell, James Goldfarb, Avi Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth |
author_sort | Campbell, James |
collection | MIT |
description | This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:37:14Z |
format | Article |
id | mit-1721.1/99173 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:37:14Z |
publishDate | 2015 |
publisher | Wiley Blackwell |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/991732022-09-29T15:00:13Z Privacy Regulation and Market Structure Campbell, James Goldfarb, Avi Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth Sloan School of Management Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet. 2015-10-06T19:36:56Z 2015-10-06T19:36:56Z 2015-02 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 10586407 1530-9134 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173 Campbell, James, Avi Goldfarb, and Catherine Tucker. “Privacy Regulation and Market Structure.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 1 (February 10, 2015): 47–73. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12079 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Wiley Blackwell SSRN |
spellingShingle | Campbell, James Goldfarb, Avi Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title | Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title_full | Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title_fullStr | Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title_full_unstemmed | Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title_short | Privacy Regulation and Market Structure |
title_sort | privacy regulation and market structure |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99173 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1847-4832 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT campbelljames privacyregulationandmarketstructure AT goldfarbavi privacyregulationandmarketstructure AT tuckercatherineelizabeth privacyregulationandmarketstructure |