On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive bidders with arbitrary demands when either the number of bidders is held constant or the number of items is held constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items a...
Main Authors: | Weinberg, Seth Matthew, Daskalakis, Konstantinos |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99946 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 |
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