Optimal Pricing Is Hard
We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer’s value distribution is a sum of independently distributed attributes, or multi-item set...
Main Authors: | Deckelbaum, Alan, Tzamos, Christos, Daskalakis, Konstantinos |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Springer-Verlag
2015
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99956 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5451-0490 |
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