Access control via coalitional power game
This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to e...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Conference Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478 |
| _version_ | 1811682597763284992 |
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| author | Guruacharya, Sudarshan Niyato, Dusit Kim, Dong In |
| author2 | School of Computer Engineering |
| author_facet | School of Computer Engineering Guruacharya, Sudarshan Niyato, Dusit Kim, Dong In |
| author_sort | Guruacharya, Sudarshan |
| collection | NTU |
| description | This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to exist in order to reflect the set of transmitters connected to either the macro base station or the femto access point. The transmitters in the same coalition cooperate by operating on non-interfering subchannels, while those in the complementary coalition are assumed to operate so as to cause maximum jamming. The value of a coalition is obtained as the max-min of utility sum of each individual in the given coalition. In the process, we also examine the optimal jamming strategy of the complementary coalition. Finally, we argue that the obtained value function cannot be super-additive. Since the super-additivity property is required for some of the solutions of cooperative game theory, we resort to the Shapley value solution, for which the super-additivity need not hold, to allocate the payoff to each user in a given coalition. Assuming that the transmitters want to be in the coalition that maximizes their payoff, we form a Markov model to obtain the stable coalition structure. We take these stable coalition structures as the required solution of our access control problem. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:59:22Z |
| format | Conference Paper |
| id | ntu-10356/100177 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T03:59:22Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1001772020-05-28T07:17:15Z Access control via coalitional power game Guruacharya, Sudarshan Niyato, Dusit Kim, Dong In School of Computer Engineering IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (2012 : Shanghai, China) DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to exist in order to reflect the set of transmitters connected to either the macro base station or the femto access point. The transmitters in the same coalition cooperate by operating on non-interfering subchannels, while those in the complementary coalition are assumed to operate so as to cause maximum jamming. The value of a coalition is obtained as the max-min of utility sum of each individual in the given coalition. In the process, we also examine the optimal jamming strategy of the complementary coalition. Finally, we argue that the obtained value function cannot be super-additive. Since the super-additivity property is required for some of the solutions of cooperative game theory, we resort to the Shapley value solution, for which the super-additivity need not hold, to allocate the payoff to each user in a given coalition. Assuming that the transmitters want to be in the coalition that maximizes their payoff, we form a Markov model to obtain the stable coalition structure. We take these stable coalition structures as the required solution of our access control problem. 2013-10-14T06:30:45Z 2019-12-06T20:17:53Z 2013-10-14T06:30:45Z 2019-12-06T20:17:53Z 2012 2012 Conference Paper Guruacharya, S., Niyato, D., & Kim, D. (2012). Access control via coalitional power game. 2012 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), pp.2824-2828. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478 10.1109/WCNC.2012.6214282 en © 2012 IEEE |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering Guruacharya, Sudarshan Niyato, Dusit Kim, Dong In Access control via coalitional power game |
| title | Access control via coalitional power game |
| title_full | Access control via coalitional power game |
| title_fullStr | Access control via coalitional power game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Access control via coalitional power game |
| title_short | Access control via coalitional power game |
| title_sort | access control via coalitional power game |
| topic | DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT guruacharyasudarshan accesscontrolviacoalitionalpowergame AT niyatodusit accesscontrolviacoalitionalpowergame AT kimdongin accesscontrolviacoalitionalpowergame |