Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect
No issue is receiving more attention in American intelligence and policy-making circles than Iran and its nuclear program. Unfortunately, it is rare for intelligence in areas like this to be fully accurate and definitive, as the Iraq case reminds us. Intelligence is hard because multiple inferences...
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 其他作者: | |
| 格式: | Working Paper |
| 语言: | English |
| 出版: |
2014
|
| 主题: | |
| 在线阅读: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104084 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/20051 |
| _version_ | 1826125377359052800 |
|---|---|
| author | Robert Jervis |
| author2 | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies |
| author_facet | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Robert Jervis |
| author_sort | Robert Jervis |
| collection | NTU |
| description | No issue is receiving more attention in American intelligence and policy-making circles than Iran and its nuclear program. Unfortunately, it is rare for intelligence in areas like this to be fully accurate and definitive, as the Iraq case reminds us. Intelligence is hard because multiple inferences are usually possible and perceivers are subject to both cognitive and affective biases, especially the tendency to perceive what they expect and to reach conclusions that meet psychological and political needs. So it is not surprising that countries in conflict usually live in quite different perceptual worlds (the Rashomon phenomenon). In dealing with Iran, one of the crucial questions is whether it is motivated by fears and the desire for security or ambitions and the desire to dominate the region. But it is hard for intelligence to analyse this question because it is so deeply involved with policy choices. Furthermore, empathy is particularly difficult here because it can be readily confused with politically unacceptable sympathy. In addition, intelligence often lacks full knowledge of American policy and has great difficulty integrating public and secret intelligence. To be maximally effective, intelligence has to be close enough to policy-makers to know their questions but not so close as to feel pressure to give the desired answers. Overall, then, intelligence is deeply involved with policy on Iran, but faces daunting handicaps. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:35:38Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | ntu-10356/104084 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:35:38Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1040842020-11-01T08:47:18Z Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect Robert Jervis S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies DRNTU::Social sciences::Political science No issue is receiving more attention in American intelligence and policy-making circles than Iran and its nuclear program. Unfortunately, it is rare for intelligence in areas like this to be fully accurate and definitive, as the Iraq case reminds us. Intelligence is hard because multiple inferences are usually possible and perceivers are subject to both cognitive and affective biases, especially the tendency to perceive what they expect and to reach conclusions that meet psychological and political needs. So it is not surprising that countries in conflict usually live in quite different perceptual worlds (the Rashomon phenomenon). In dealing with Iran, one of the crucial questions is whether it is motivated by fears and the desire for security or ambitions and the desire to dominate the region. But it is hard for intelligence to analyse this question because it is so deeply involved with policy choices. Furthermore, empathy is particularly difficult here because it can be readily confused with politically unacceptable sympathy. In addition, intelligence often lacks full knowledge of American policy and has great difficulty integrating public and secret intelligence. To be maximally effective, intelligence has to be close enough to policy-makers to know their questions but not so close as to feel pressure to give the desired answers. Overall, then, intelligence is deeply involved with policy on Iran, but faces daunting handicaps. 2014-07-03T08:23:00Z 2019-12-06T21:26:02Z 2014-07-03T08:23:00Z 2019-12-06T21:26:02Z 2013 2013 Working Paper Robert Jervis. (2013). Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect. (RSIS Working Paper, No. 257). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104084 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/20051 en RSIS Workingpaper, 257-13 NTU 39 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | DRNTU::Social sciences::Political science Robert Jervis Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title | Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title_full | Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title_fullStr | Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title_full_unstemmed | Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title_short | Iran : how intelligence and policy intersect |
| title_sort | iran how intelligence and policy intersect |
| topic | DRNTU::Social sciences::Political science |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104084 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/20051 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT robertjervis iranhowintelligenceandpolicyintersect |