Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing
Recently, Mobile Crowdsourcing (MC) has aroused great interest on the part of both academic and industrial circles. One of the key problems in MC is designing the proper mechanisms to incentivize user participation, as users are typically self-interested and must consume a substantial amount of MC r...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104491 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/50013 |
| _version_ | 1811687644284846080 |
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| author | Han, Kai Liu, Huan Tang, Shaojie Xiao, Mingjun Luo, Jun |
| author2 | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
| author_facet | School of Computer Science and Engineering Han, Kai Liu, Huan Tang, Shaojie Xiao, Mingjun Luo, Jun |
| author_sort | Han, Kai |
| collection | NTU |
| description | Recently, Mobile Crowdsourcing (MC) has aroused great interest on the part of both academic and industrial circles. One of the key problems in MC is designing the proper mechanisms to incentivize user participation, as users are typically self-interested and must consume a substantial amount of MC resources/costs. Although considerable research has been devoted to this problem, the majority of studies have neglected the privacy issue in mechanism design. In this study, we consider the scenario where a mobile crowdsourcing platform aims to maximize the crowdsourcing revenue under a budget constraint, and users are interested in maximizing their utility while keeping their cost private. We design differentially-private mechanisms for such a scenario under an offline setting where users bid their costs simultaneously and under an online setting where user bids are revealed one by one. We show that our mechanisms simultaneously achieve provable performance bounds with respect to several measures, including revenue, differential privacy, truthfulness, and individual rationality. Finally, we also conduct extensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:19:35Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/104491 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:19:35Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1044912020-03-07T11:50:50Z Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing Han, Kai Liu, Huan Tang, Shaojie Xiao, Mingjun Luo, Jun School of Computer Science and Engineering Mobile Crowdsourcing Differential Privacy Engineering::Computer science and engineering Recently, Mobile Crowdsourcing (MC) has aroused great interest on the part of both academic and industrial circles. One of the key problems in MC is designing the proper mechanisms to incentivize user participation, as users are typically self-interested and must consume a substantial amount of MC resources/costs. Although considerable research has been devoted to this problem, the majority of studies have neglected the privacy issue in mechanism design. In this study, we consider the scenario where a mobile crowdsourcing platform aims to maximize the crowdsourcing revenue under a budget constraint, and users are interested in maximizing their utility while keeping their cost private. We design differentially-private mechanisms for such a scenario under an offline setting where users bid their costs simultaneously and under an online setting where user bids are revealed one by one. We show that our mechanisms simultaneously achieve provable performance bounds with respect to several measures, including revenue, differential privacy, truthfulness, and individual rationality. Finally, we also conduct extensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Accepted version 2019-09-26T02:47:04Z 2019-12-06T21:34:00Z 2019-09-26T02:47:04Z 2019-12-06T21:34:00Z 2018 Journal Article Han, K., Liu, H., Tang, S., Xiao, M., & Luo, J. (2019). Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 18(4), 934-946. doi:10.1109/TMC.2018.2848265 1536-1233 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104491 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/50013 10.1109/TMC.2018.2848265 en IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing © 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2018.2848265 13 p. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Mobile Crowdsourcing Differential Privacy Engineering::Computer science and engineering Han, Kai Liu, Huan Tang, Shaojie Xiao, Mingjun Luo, Jun Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title | Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title_full | Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title_fullStr | Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title_full_unstemmed | Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title_short | Differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| title_sort | differentially private mechanisms for budget limited mobile crowdsourcing |
| topic | Mobile Crowdsourcing Differential Privacy Engineering::Computer science and engineering |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104491 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/50013 |
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