CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reve...

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Main Authors: Gao, Huasheng, Harford, Jarrad, Li, Kai
Other Authors: Nanyang Business School
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: 2013
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107244
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18162
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author Gao, Huasheng
Harford, Jarrad
Li, Kai
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Gao, Huasheng
Harford, Jarrad
Li, Kai
author_sort Gao, Huasheng
collection NTU
description We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare.
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spelling ntu-10356/1072442023-05-19T06:44:41Z CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences Gao, Huasheng Harford, Jarrad Li, Kai Nanyang Business School DRNTU::Business::Finance::Corporate finance We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare. 2013-12-06T08:41:08Z 2019-12-06T22:27:17Z 2013-12-06T08:41:08Z 2019-12-06T22:27:17Z 2012 2012 Journal Article Gao, H., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2012). CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences. Journal of corporate finance, 18(2), 291-310. 0929-1199 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107244 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18162 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.001 en Journal of corporate finance
spellingShingle DRNTU::Business::Finance::Corporate finance
Gao, Huasheng
Harford, Jarrad
Li, Kai
CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title_full CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title_fullStr CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title_full_unstemmed CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title_short CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences
title_sort ceo pay cuts and forced turnover their causes and consequences
topic DRNTU::Business::Finance::Corporate finance
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/107244
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18162
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AT harfordjarrad ceopaycutsandforcedturnovertheircausesandconsequences
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