Why the method of cases doesn’t work
In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine...
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142430 |
| _version_ | 1811688027792080896 |
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| author | Suhler, Christopher Louis |
| author2 | School of Humanities |
| author_facet | School of Humanities Suhler, Christopher Louis |
| author_sort | Suhler, Christopher Louis |
| collection | NTU |
| description | In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases (MoC) – the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases – plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements in philosophy. Drawing on work from cognitive psychology, I argue that there is a fundamental incompatibility between (a) the structure of the theories that philosophers seek to construct using the MoC and (b) the structure of the concepts on which our case-specific intuitions are based. This incompatibility renders MoC-based philosophical theorizing unable ever to succeed by the very standards of adequacy that it sets for itself. And this, in turn, helps to explain the depth and persistence of theoretical disagreements – and, in certain ways, the lack of progress – in the many areas of philosophy where the MoC plays an important role. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:25:41Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/142430 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T05:25:41Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1424302020-06-22T04:08:26Z Why the method of cases doesn’t work Suhler, Christopher Louis School of Humanities Humanities::Philosophy Method of Cases Intuitions In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases (MoC) – the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases – plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements in philosophy. Drawing on work from cognitive psychology, I argue that there is a fundamental incompatibility between (a) the structure of the theories that philosophers seek to construct using the MoC and (b) the structure of the concepts on which our case-specific intuitions are based. This incompatibility renders MoC-based philosophical theorizing unable ever to succeed by the very standards of adequacy that it sets for itself. And this, in turn, helps to explain the depth and persistence of theoretical disagreements – and, in certain ways, the lack of progress – in the many areas of philosophy where the MoC plays an important role. Accepted version 2020-06-22T04:08:26Z 2020-06-22T04:08:26Z 2019 Journal Article Suhler, C. L. (2019). Why the method of cases doesn’t work. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), 825-847. doi:10.1007/s13164-019-00433-0 1878-5158 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142430 10.1007/s13164-019-00433-0 4 10 825 847 en M4081899 Review of Philosophy and Psychology © 2019 Springer Nature B.V. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of Philosophy and Psychology. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-019-00433-0 application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Humanities::Philosophy Method of Cases Intuitions Suhler, Christopher Louis Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title | Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title_full | Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title_fullStr | Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title_short | Why the method of cases doesn’t work |
| title_sort | why the method of cases doesn t work |
| topic | Humanities::Philosophy Method of Cases Intuitions |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142430 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT suhlerchristopherlouis whythemethodofcasesdoesntwork |