Information control in the hold-up problem
We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compro...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2020
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534 |
| _version_ | 1811676772046995456 |
|---|---|
| author | Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong |
| author2 | School of Social Sciences |
| author_facet | School of Social Sciences Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong |
| author_sort | Nguyen, Anh |
| collection | NTU |
| description | We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T02:26:47Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/143534 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T02:26:47Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1435342020-09-08T01:24:41Z Information control in the hold-up problem Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong School of Social Sciences Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks. Accepted version 2020-09-08T01:24:40Z 2020-09-08T01:24:40Z 2019 Journal Article Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295 0741-6261 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534 10.1111/1756-2171.12295 2-s2.0-85072230818 4 50 768 786 en RAND Journal of Economics This is the accepted version of the following article: Nguyen, A., & Tan, T. Y. (2019). Information control in the hold‐up problem. The RAND Journal of Economics, 50(4), 768–786., which has been published in final form at doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12295. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with the Wiley Self-Archiving Policy [https://authorservices.wiley.com/authorresources/Journal-Authors/licensing/self-archiving.html]. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control Nguyen, Anh Tan, Teck Yong Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title | Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title_full | Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title_fullStr | Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title_full_unstemmed | Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title_short | Information control in the hold-up problem |
| title_sort | information control in the hold up problem |
| topic | Social sciences::Economic theory Hold-up Information Control |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/143534 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nguyenanh informationcontrolintheholdupproblem AT tanteckyong informationcontrolintheholdupproblem |