Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs

As an emerging role in on-chip communication, the optical networks-on-chip (ONoCs) can provide ultra-high bandwidth, low latency and low power dissipation for the data transfer. However, the thermo-optic effects of the photonic devices have a great impact on the operating performance and reliability...

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Main Authors: Zhou, Jun, Li, Mengquan, Guo, Pengxing, Liu, Weichen
Other Authors: School of Computer Science and Engineering
Format: Conference Paper
Language:English
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144232
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author Zhou, Jun
Li, Mengquan
Guo, Pengxing
Liu, Weichen
author2 School of Computer Science and Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Science and Engineering
Zhou, Jun
Li, Mengquan
Guo, Pengxing
Liu, Weichen
author_sort Zhou, Jun
collection NTU
description As an emerging role in on-chip communication, the optical networks-on-chip (ONoCs) can provide ultra-high bandwidth, low latency and low power dissipation for the data transfer. However, the thermo-optic effects of the photonic devices have a great impact on the operating performance and reliability of ONoCs, where the thermal-aware control is used to alleviate it. Furthermore, the temperature-sensitive ONoCs are prone to be attacked by the hardware Trojans (HTs) covertly embedded in the integrated circuits (ICs) from the malicious third-party components, leading to performance degradation, denial of service (DoS), or even permanent damages. In this paper, we focus on the tampering attacks on optical sampling during the thermal sensing process in ONoCs. Corresponding approaches are proposed to mitigate the negative impacts from HT attacks. Evaluation results indicate that our approach can significantly enhance the hardware security of thermal sensing for ONoC with trivial overheads of up to 3.06% and 2.6% in average latency and energy consumption, respectively.
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spelling ntu-10356/1442322020-10-21T07:22:11Z Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs Zhou, Jun Li, Mengquan Guo, Pengxing Liu, Weichen School of Computer Science and Engineering 2020 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI) Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware::Input/output and data communications Handheld Computers Integrated Circuit Reliability As an emerging role in on-chip communication, the optical networks-on-chip (ONoCs) can provide ultra-high bandwidth, low latency and low power dissipation for the data transfer. However, the thermo-optic effects of the photonic devices have a great impact on the operating performance and reliability of ONoCs, where the thermal-aware control is used to alleviate it. Furthermore, the temperature-sensitive ONoCs are prone to be attacked by the hardware Trojans (HTs) covertly embedded in the integrated circuits (ICs) from the malicious third-party components, leading to performance degradation, denial of service (DoS), or even permanent damages. In this paper, we focus on the tampering attacks on optical sampling during the thermal sensing process in ONoCs. Corresponding approaches are proposed to mitigate the negative impacts from HT attacks. Evaluation results indicate that our approach can significantly enhance the hardware security of thermal sensing for ONoC with trivial overheads of up to 3.06% and 2.6% in average latency and energy consumption, respectively. Ministry of Education (MOE) Accepted version 2020-10-21T07:22:11Z 2020-10-21T07:22:11Z 2020 Conference Paper Zhou, J., Li, M., Guo, P., & Liu, W. (2020). Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs. 2020 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). doi:10.1109/ISVLSI49217.2020.00009 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144232 10.1109/ISVLSI49217.2020.00009 en © 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/ISVLSI49217.2020.00009 application/pdf
spellingShingle Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware::Input/output and data communications
Handheld Computers
Integrated Circuit Reliability
Zhou, Jun
Li, Mengquan
Guo, Pengxing
Liu, Weichen
Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title_full Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title_fullStr Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title_full_unstemmed Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title_short Mitigation of tampering attacks for MR-based thermal sensing in optical NoCs
title_sort mitigation of tampering attacks for mr based thermal sensing in optical nocs
topic Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Hardware::Input/output and data communications
Handheld Computers
Integrated Circuit Reliability
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144232
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