A Stackelberg game approach toward socially-aware incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing
Mobile crowdsensing has shown great potential in addressing large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive a satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently r...
Main Authors: | Nie, Jiangtian, Luo, Jun, Xiong, Zehui, Niyato, Dusit, Wang, Ping |
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Other Authors: | School of Computer Science and Engineering |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/144595 |
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