Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion
I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146656 |
| _version_ | 1811690914565849088 |
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| author | Yin, Huaxiang |
| author2 | Nanyang Business School |
| author_facet | Nanyang Business School Yin, Huaxiang |
| author_sort | Yin, Huaxiang |
| collection | NTU |
| description | I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:11:34Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/146656 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T06:11:34Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1466562023-05-19T07:31:18Z Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion Yin, Huaxiang Nanyang Business School Business::Accounting Indirect Reciprocity Employee-based Control I investigate whether organizations can use the "power of the employee" to reduce managers' opportunistic behavior toward others. I predict that revealing this behavior to employees makes managers less inclined to act opportunistically. Employees' knowledge has a stronger impact on reducing managers' opportunistic behavior when managers have discretion over employee rewards versus when they do not. I further predict that the effect of employee-based control depends on whether managers are other-interested versus self-interested. Revealing manager actions alone is sufficient to reduce other-interested managers' opportunism, even when they lack discretion over employee rewards. Revealing manager actions alone has no discernible influence on self-interested managers' opportunism, but pairing this action with granting them discretion over employee compensation does reduce their opportunism. Results of two experiments support my predictions, and these results have important implications. By relying on the power of the employee, organizations can induce (even selfish) managers to act less opportunistically. 2021-03-04T06:04:45Z 2021-03-04T06:04:45Z 2021 Journal Article Yin, H. (2021). Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion. The Accounting Review. doi:10.2308/TAR-2015-0219 0001-4826 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146656 10.2308/TAR-2015-0219 en The Accounting Review © 2021 American Accounting Association. All rights reserved. |
| spellingShingle | Business::Accounting Indirect Reciprocity Employee-based Control Yin, Huaxiang Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title | Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title_full | Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title_fullStr | Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title_short | Can employees exercise control over managers? The role of the employees’ knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| title_sort | can employees exercise control over managers the role of the employees knowledge of manager behavior and manager discretion |
| topic | Business::Accounting Indirect Reciprocity Employee-based Control |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146656 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yinhuaxiang canemployeesexercisecontrolovermanagerstheroleoftheemployeesknowledgeofmanagerbehaviorandmanagerdiscretion |