Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks
We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individu...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146765 |
| _version_ | 1826127240865251328 |
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| author | Bouveret, Géraldine Mandel, Antoine |
| author2 | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences |
| author_facet | School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Bouveret, Géraldine Mandel, Antoine |
| author_sort | Bouveret, Géraldine |
| collection | NTU |
| description | We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:05:35Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | ntu-10356/146765 |
| institution | Nanyang Technological University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-10-01T07:05:35Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | ntu-10356/1467652023-02-28T19:59:41Z Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks Bouveret, Géraldine Mandel, Antoine School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Science Social sciences Network Epidemic Spreading We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies. Accepted version 2021-03-10T01:57:57Z 2021-03-10T01:57:57Z 2021 Journal Article Bouveret, G., & Mandel, A. (2021). Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 93, 102486-. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102486 0304-4068 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146765 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102486 93 102486 en Journal of Mathematical Economics © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This paper was published in Journal of Mathematical Economics and is made available with permission of Elsevier B.V. application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Science Social sciences Network Epidemic Spreading Bouveret, Géraldine Mandel, Antoine Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title | Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title_full | Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title_fullStr | Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title_short | Social interactions and the prophylaxis of SI epidemics on networks |
| title_sort | social interactions and the prophylaxis of si epidemics on networks |
| topic | Science Social sciences Network Epidemic Spreading |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/146765 |
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